Offshore
-
Teun Visser
Re: Offshore
[/quote]
... Hieronder het laatste news verkregen via "Oil and Gas".
MVG Teun Visser.
===============
HOUSTON, May 6 -- BP PLC and its contractors worked May 6 to lower an oil spill containment structure about 5,000 ft down to the seabed on Mississippi Canyon Block 252 off Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. Oil was confirmed touching both sides of the Chandeleur island chain.
It’s hoped the containment system, once operational, will collect much of the oil and greatly reduce the volume of the oil reaching the shore. Suttles said the containment system might reach the seabed yet late on May 6.
Doug Suttles, chief operating officer of BP Exploration & Production Inc., said the containment system will not stop or reduce the actual volume of the spill, which is estimated at 5,000 b/d. The containment system will be placed over the riser while other efforts continue to stop the flow coming from the wellhead, he said.
Transocean Ltd.’s Deepwater Horizon semisubmersible drilled the Macondo well for BP and its partners, Anadarko Petroleum Corp. and Mitsui Oil Exploration Co. Ltd. BP is the operator.
An Apr. 20 explosion and fire left 11 crew members missing and presumed dead. The Deepwater Horizon sank on Apr. 22 (OGJ, May 3, 2010, p. 31). The well struck oil and associated gas with the oil being 35° gravity.
During a May 6 news conference, the Shoreline Clean-up Assessment Team confirmed oil had reached both the beaches and the marshes of the Chandeleur island chain. Mary Cocklam-Vendle, BP shoreline response manager, said BP was working with state and federal agencies on developing and implementing shoreline cleanup plans.
Containment system deployed
The 40 ft x 24 ft x 14 ft steel vessel weighs 98 tons. Wild Well Control designed the subsea containment structure, which left dock at Port Fourchon, La., on May 5.
After reaching the seabed, the process of testing and commissioning the system will begin. If everything goes well, the system could be operational on May 10, although Suttles emphasizes it’s a complex operation never done at this water depth.
BP plans to lower the dome over the riser, one of the two leak sites, on the seabed to capture the oil. Plans call for the dome to be connected by a riser to a drillship at the surface. The intent is to pump the collected oil and gas to Transocean’s Discoverer Enterprise drillship.
"We will probably have start-up trouble," Suttles said of the subsea containment system. "We'll have to learn how to make it work."
Meanwhile, engineers also are working on possibly using a technique known as a top kill, which involves pumping a heavy liquid into the well to stop the flow of oil. Suttles said this tactic has been used on land and in shallow water but not in 5,000 ft of water.
The top kill would involve reconfiguring the blowout preventer (BOP). Another option being considered is to put an additional BOP on top of the BOP stack already at the wellhead, Suttles said.
He said "the yellow pod or brains" of the first BOP had been retrieved, and workers hoped they could reinstall this mechanism so that it would read the pressure inside the BOP. Suttles emphasized BP does not want to do anything that could make the spill worse.
In addition to these efforts, a relief well is being drilled. It had reached 7,800 ft depth from the water's surface as of May 6, Suttles said.
Transocean discusses insurance
Transocean executives said May 6 the company received $401 million as partial payment for expected insurance recoveries from the Deepwater Horizon. The total insured value of the rig was $560 million, subject to a deductible of up to $1.5 million.
Under the drilling contract, BP assumed full responsibility and indemnified Transocean of any loss, expense, claim, fine, penalty, or liability for pollution, Transocean President and Chief Executive Officer Steven L. Newman told analysts during a first-quarter earnings conference call.
In a filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, Transocean said, “We can provide no assurances as to the estimated costs, insurance recoveries, or other actions that will result from this incident.”
The rig operated under a contract with BP through September 2013, but total loss of the rig trigged automatic termination of the agreement. Transocean said it will be negatively impacted by loss of revenue from the Deepwater Horizon, adding the company does not carry insurance for loss of revenue.
“There have been numerous lawsuits filed related to the incident, and we expect additional lawsuits to be filed,” Transocean said in its SEC filing. “We expect to incur significant legal fees and costs in responding to these matters.”
Raymond James & Associates Inc. analysts noted Transocean carried $950 million of excess coverage, which they believe “should be sufficient to cover any lawsuit settlements.” They said, “While we do expect significant legal costs going forward, we still believe that the financial risk for Transocean is relatively manageable for the Deepwater Horizon accident.”
Napolitano visits Mississippi, Florida
US Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano and Department of Commerce Secretary Gary Locke met with Mississippi Gov. Haley Barbour in Biloxi, Miss., and Florida Gov. Charlie Crist in Pensacola, Fla., on May 6.
Napolitano and Locke also met with community business leaders and visiting response operations in their ongoing emphasis on interagency coordination. In Biloxi, Napolitano said the oil spill could prove to be “a long-term event.”
In St. Petersburg, Fla., representatives from BP, USCG, and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection reviewed an area contingency plan regarding various national and state wildlife refuge areas on Florida’s west coast.
... Hieronder het laatste news verkregen via "Oil and Gas".
MVG Teun Visser.
===============
HOUSTON, May 6 -- BP PLC and its contractors worked May 6 to lower an oil spill containment structure about 5,000 ft down to the seabed on Mississippi Canyon Block 252 off Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. Oil was confirmed touching both sides of the Chandeleur island chain.
It’s hoped the containment system, once operational, will collect much of the oil and greatly reduce the volume of the oil reaching the shore. Suttles said the containment system might reach the seabed yet late on May 6.
Doug Suttles, chief operating officer of BP Exploration & Production Inc., said the containment system will not stop or reduce the actual volume of the spill, which is estimated at 5,000 b/d. The containment system will be placed over the riser while other efforts continue to stop the flow coming from the wellhead, he said.
Transocean Ltd.’s Deepwater Horizon semisubmersible drilled the Macondo well for BP and its partners, Anadarko Petroleum Corp. and Mitsui Oil Exploration Co. Ltd. BP is the operator.
An Apr. 20 explosion and fire left 11 crew members missing and presumed dead. The Deepwater Horizon sank on Apr. 22 (OGJ, May 3, 2010, p. 31). The well struck oil and associated gas with the oil being 35° gravity.
During a May 6 news conference, the Shoreline Clean-up Assessment Team confirmed oil had reached both the beaches and the marshes of the Chandeleur island chain. Mary Cocklam-Vendle, BP shoreline response manager, said BP was working with state and federal agencies on developing and implementing shoreline cleanup plans.
Containment system deployed
The 40 ft x 24 ft x 14 ft steel vessel weighs 98 tons. Wild Well Control designed the subsea containment structure, which left dock at Port Fourchon, La., on May 5.
After reaching the seabed, the process of testing and commissioning the system will begin. If everything goes well, the system could be operational on May 10, although Suttles emphasizes it’s a complex operation never done at this water depth.
BP plans to lower the dome over the riser, one of the two leak sites, on the seabed to capture the oil. Plans call for the dome to be connected by a riser to a drillship at the surface. The intent is to pump the collected oil and gas to Transocean’s Discoverer Enterprise drillship.
"We will probably have start-up trouble," Suttles said of the subsea containment system. "We'll have to learn how to make it work."
Meanwhile, engineers also are working on possibly using a technique known as a top kill, which involves pumping a heavy liquid into the well to stop the flow of oil. Suttles said this tactic has been used on land and in shallow water but not in 5,000 ft of water.
The top kill would involve reconfiguring the blowout preventer (BOP). Another option being considered is to put an additional BOP on top of the BOP stack already at the wellhead, Suttles said.
He said "the yellow pod or brains" of the first BOP had been retrieved, and workers hoped they could reinstall this mechanism so that it would read the pressure inside the BOP. Suttles emphasized BP does not want to do anything that could make the spill worse.
In addition to these efforts, a relief well is being drilled. It had reached 7,800 ft depth from the water's surface as of May 6, Suttles said.
Transocean discusses insurance
Transocean executives said May 6 the company received $401 million as partial payment for expected insurance recoveries from the Deepwater Horizon. The total insured value of the rig was $560 million, subject to a deductible of up to $1.5 million.
Under the drilling contract, BP assumed full responsibility and indemnified Transocean of any loss, expense, claim, fine, penalty, or liability for pollution, Transocean President and Chief Executive Officer Steven L. Newman told analysts during a first-quarter earnings conference call.
In a filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, Transocean said, “We can provide no assurances as to the estimated costs, insurance recoveries, or other actions that will result from this incident.”
The rig operated under a contract with BP through September 2013, but total loss of the rig trigged automatic termination of the agreement. Transocean said it will be negatively impacted by loss of revenue from the Deepwater Horizon, adding the company does not carry insurance for loss of revenue.
“There have been numerous lawsuits filed related to the incident, and we expect additional lawsuits to be filed,” Transocean said in its SEC filing. “We expect to incur significant legal fees and costs in responding to these matters.”
Raymond James & Associates Inc. analysts noted Transocean carried $950 million of excess coverage, which they believe “should be sufficient to cover any lawsuit settlements.” They said, “While we do expect significant legal costs going forward, we still believe that the financial risk for Transocean is relatively manageable for the Deepwater Horizon accident.”
Napolitano visits Mississippi, Florida
US Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano and Department of Commerce Secretary Gary Locke met with Mississippi Gov. Haley Barbour in Biloxi, Miss., and Florida Gov. Charlie Crist in Pensacola, Fla., on May 6.
Napolitano and Locke also met with community business leaders and visiting response operations in their ongoing emphasis on interagency coordination. In Biloxi, Napolitano said the oil spill could prove to be “a long-term event.”
In St. Petersburg, Fla., representatives from BP, USCG, and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection reviewed an area contingency plan regarding various national and state wildlife refuge areas on Florida’s west coast.
-
cor bal
Re: Offshore
[quote="Teun Visser"][quote]
Beste Cor ... ik heb getracht, via diverse mailtjes op de scheveningse site "allesoverscheveningen" te vragen de bron van hetgene welke ik op de scheveningse site topic "berging en sleepvaart" had gezet.
Namelijk de story van een werknemer welke alles live heeft ondervonden op de semi-sub Deepwater Horizon te vermelden.
ook in het verleden diverse malen op beide sites, de scheveningse en Kombuispraat, je verzocht de bron te vermelden maar helaas ook deze keer op kombuispraat dus niet ... jammer!!
MVG Teun Visser.[/quote
Hoi Teun sorry dat het even geduurd heb met bronvermelding, maar deze jongen was naar een crematie en lees dit nu pas.
gr Cor
Beste Cor ... ik heb getracht, via diverse mailtjes op de scheveningse site "allesoverscheveningen" te vragen de bron van hetgene welke ik op de scheveningse site topic "berging en sleepvaart" had gezet.
Namelijk de story van een werknemer welke alles live heeft ondervonden op de semi-sub Deepwater Horizon te vermelden.
ook in het verleden diverse malen op beide sites, de scheveningse en Kombuispraat, je verzocht de bron te vermelden maar helaas ook deze keer op kombuispraat dus niet ... jammer!!
MVG Teun Visser.[/quote
Hoi Teun sorry dat het even geduurd heb met bronvermelding, maar deze jongen was naar een crematie en lees dit nu pas.
gr Cor
-
Teun Visser
Re: Offshore
quote]... Hoi Rob, ja ik ken deze site ... maar diverse blowouts en disasters zijn onbekend gebleven ... of achter de schermen gehouden.
Maar deze ramp zal ook weer in de boeken worden omschreven ....het blijkt vaak in de praktijk dat met de voorschriften niet worden nagestreeft.... na alle raporten te hebben bekeken ... is na de "negatieve test" geen bewijs dat deze test goed is uitgevoerd en is geregistreert .... normal zou deze reporten met "DDR" (lees daily drilling report) verstuurd moeten zijn door de club welke de test en cementaties uitvoeren, in dit geval Halliburton.
ook blijkt uit de reporten dat de completetion (de productiebuis) later door een andere rig zou worden uitgevoerd.
Dus het was simpel de boorput afdichten dmv, een mechanische plug( bridge plug) daar boven op een balance cement plug.
Voordat men een bridgeplug zet moet eerst het gedeelte van de casing worden schoongemaakt voor een goede afdichting dmv een casing scraper. Dan zet men een bridge plug vervolgens word de casing getest, dan word er op een andere diepte een balance cement plug gezet. Deze moet als de cement hard is ook getest worden, eerst "dynamisch"met @ 10tons @ 20Klbs... maar ook dmv er druk op de casing te pumpen.
Pas als dit alles is gedaan kan men overgaan om de riser te "displacen" van de boorspoeling (dit kan brine zijn of oilbase mud of waterbase mud) to seawater. Doordat de gehele test waarschijnlijk niet naar behoren is uitgevoerd is er gas door de plug(gen) ophoog gekomen. dit moet je vergelijken met een flesjec cola wat je goed geschud heeft en direct daarna open maakt.... het gas misschien met een gewicht of 0.1ppg per feet perculeert naar boven de druk binnnenin de gasbel word lager het volume word groter naar gelang de gasbel hoger komt....daarbij is de waterdiepte @ 4900ft ... wat ongeveer een druk is van 140 bar , @ 0.5psi per feet. De gasbel kwam dus met grote druk naar het oppervlak van de rig en blies al he seawater uit de riser (18 3/4"ID) ... het gas stroomde vermoedlijk in lager gelegen ruimtes ... misschien de pompkamenrs of machine ruimtes .... en is op een of andere wijze onstoken ...waar toen de tragedy ontstond....
Dus al met al human error!!!... met grote gevolgen .... instussen lekt er @ 5000BPD uit drie plaatsen , vermoedelijk denk ik a) de drill pipe, b) de chokeline, c) de kill line. Dan te bedenken dat als de olieprijs 70$ zou zijn BP zo'n 127milloen vangen per jaar..!!!
Maar en zijn nog vele andere vragen, mij inziens, na zelf vele jaren op "floating"rigs hebben gewerkt is mijn grote vraag waarom de "Fast respons" van de Blowout perventers niet naar behoren hebben gefuncioneerd.
Er besttat op elke floating rig een system waarbij emergency een sysstem kan worden geactiveerd waarbij alle BOP's (blowout preventers) hermatisch de boorput afsluiten, eerst word de drillstring afgeknipt door de "blind/shear rams" deze zorgd ook dat de boorput dicht zit en geen gas of olie kan ontsnappen.
Waarom heeft dit subsea mechanisme niet gewerkt ... want dit is de kernvraag????
Dus naast de human error tevens een mechanical failure!!!!
De plannen zijn zoals boven te zien ..een relief put te boren ....wat toch snel als alles meezit 2 maanden zal duren.
MVG Teun Visser.
Drilling supervisor (Caspian Sea).
Maar deze ramp zal ook weer in de boeken worden omschreven ....het blijkt vaak in de praktijk dat met de voorschriften niet worden nagestreeft.... na alle raporten te hebben bekeken ... is na de "negatieve test" geen bewijs dat deze test goed is uitgevoerd en is geregistreert .... normal zou deze reporten met "DDR" (lees daily drilling report) verstuurd moeten zijn door de club welke de test en cementaties uitvoeren, in dit geval Halliburton.
ook blijkt uit de reporten dat de completetion (de productiebuis) later door een andere rig zou worden uitgevoerd.
Dus het was simpel de boorput afdichten dmv, een mechanische plug( bridge plug) daar boven op een balance cement plug.
Voordat men een bridgeplug zet moet eerst het gedeelte van de casing worden schoongemaakt voor een goede afdichting dmv een casing scraper. Dan zet men een bridge plug vervolgens word de casing getest, dan word er op een andere diepte een balance cement plug gezet. Deze moet als de cement hard is ook getest worden, eerst "dynamisch"met @ 10tons @ 20Klbs... maar ook dmv er druk op de casing te pumpen.
Pas als dit alles is gedaan kan men overgaan om de riser te "displacen" van de boorspoeling (dit kan brine zijn of oilbase mud of waterbase mud) to seawater. Doordat de gehele test waarschijnlijk niet naar behoren is uitgevoerd is er gas door de plug(gen) ophoog gekomen. dit moet je vergelijken met een flesjec cola wat je goed geschud heeft en direct daarna open maakt.... het gas misschien met een gewicht of 0.1ppg per feet perculeert naar boven de druk binnnenin de gasbel word lager het volume word groter naar gelang de gasbel hoger komt....daarbij is de waterdiepte @ 4900ft ... wat ongeveer een druk is van 140 bar , @ 0.5psi per feet. De gasbel kwam dus met grote druk naar het oppervlak van de rig en blies al he seawater uit de riser (18 3/4"ID) ... het gas stroomde vermoedlijk in lager gelegen ruimtes ... misschien de pompkamenrs of machine ruimtes .... en is op een of andere wijze onstoken ...waar toen de tragedy ontstond....
Dus al met al human error!!!... met grote gevolgen .... instussen lekt er @ 5000BPD uit drie plaatsen , vermoedelijk denk ik a) de drill pipe, b) de chokeline, c) de kill line. Dan te bedenken dat als de olieprijs 70$ zou zijn BP zo'n 127milloen vangen per jaar..!!!
Maar en zijn nog vele andere vragen, mij inziens, na zelf vele jaren op "floating"rigs hebben gewerkt is mijn grote vraag waarom de "Fast respons" van de Blowout perventers niet naar behoren hebben gefuncioneerd.
Er besttat op elke floating rig een system waarbij emergency een sysstem kan worden geactiveerd waarbij alle BOP's (blowout preventers) hermatisch de boorput afsluiten, eerst word de drillstring afgeknipt door de "blind/shear rams" deze zorgd ook dat de boorput dicht zit en geen gas of olie kan ontsnappen.
Waarom heeft dit subsea mechanisme niet gewerkt ... want dit is de kernvraag????
Dus naast de human error tevens een mechanical failure!!!!
De plannen zijn zoals boven te zien ..een relief put te boren ....wat toch snel als alles meezit 2 maanden zal duren.
MVG Teun Visser.
Drilling supervisor (Caspian Sea).
Re: Offshore
BP tegenslag.
De opvangtrechter gaat helaas weer even omhoog en wordt aangepast. Er schijnen ijskristallen en/of gashydraten(?) te ontstaan en dat geeft verstoppingen. Dat zal vermoedelijk wel bij het tuutje boven op de trechter plaatsvinden.Expansie?
Nu lijkt dat tuutje op de foto, in verhouding met de rest van de koepel, ook wel een beetje aan de krappe kant.Kan natuurlijk ook optisch bedrog zijn.
We wachten af.
Gr.Harry
De opvangtrechter gaat helaas weer even omhoog en wordt aangepast. Er schijnen ijskristallen en/of gashydraten(?) te ontstaan en dat geeft verstoppingen. Dat zal vermoedelijk wel bij het tuutje boven op de trechter plaatsvinden.Expansie?
Nu lijkt dat tuutje op de foto, in verhouding met de rest van de koepel, ook wel een beetje aan de krappe kant.Kan natuurlijk ook optisch bedrog zijn.
We wachten af.
- tuutje.jpg (31.12 KiB) 2727 keer bekeken
Varen is hunkeren naar land.
Re: Offshore
Ik vind de verhandeling van Teun wel erg leerzaam en duidelijk.
Dank hiervoor !.
m.v.g. Roy
Dank hiervoor !.
m.v.g. Roy
Een individu weet meer niet dan wel.
Laat dat a.u.b. zo blijven................
Laat dat a.u.b. zo blijven................
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Teun Visser
Re: Offshore
[quote="BU-6"]BP tegenslag.
De opvangtrechter gaat helaas weer even omhoog en wordt aangepast. Er schijnen ijskristallen en/of gashydraten(?) te ontstaan en dat geeft verstoppingen. Dat zal vermoedelijk wel bij het tuutje boven op de trechter plaatsvinden.Expansie?
Nu lijkt dat tuutje op de foto, in verhouding met de rest van de koepel, ook wel een beetje aan de krappe kant.Kan natuurlijk ook optisch bedrog zijn.
We wachten af. Gr.Harry
[quote]
Hydrate is een ijsvorming welke ontstaat door lage temperatuur, hoge druk en gas .... de remedie is om het te verwijderen is methanol te injecteren ...dus in dit geval moet men in de opvangtrechter een druk van @ 172 bar (hydrostatische druk op ocean bodem @5000ft) overbruggen ...om hydrate te voorkomen moet men Glycol injecteren gedurende de flow van olie en gas welke door de onvangtrechter ophoog naar het oppervlakte komt.
In geval van hydrate vorming kan het voorkomen dat het niet mogelijk is de veiligheidskleppen, afsluiters of blowout preventers te laten functioneren.
Persoonlijk denk ik dat er via een kill line welke, opzij is gemonteert van de riser naar surface, de Glycol met mate word geinjecteert gedurende de flow van hetgene (gas & olie) ophoog komt via de opvangtrechter.
Glycol is onschadelijk voor het material en milieu, Methanol daar integen is schadelijk voor onderdelen met rubber, denk daarmee aan seals en andere afdichtings materialen.
MVG TVisser
=======================
Hieronder een van de laatste berichten verkregenvia Rig zone.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
BP Considers Alternatives
Sunday, May 09, 2010
The first attempt to contain leaking crude oil from the Macondo well and funnel it to a
drillship 5,000 feet above failed after gas hydrates accumulated inside the cofferdam
and plugged up the top of the dome, BP reported Saturday.
"I wouldn't say it's failed yet," BP Chief Operating Officer Doug Suttles
said Saturday afternoon of the subsea containment strategy. The BP executive said
that his company is now looking for a way to overcome this latest challenge, tapping
expertise from throughout the oil and gas industry for possible solutions.
Slushy hydrates, ice-like crystals produced by the combination of natural gas and
water at certain temperatures and pressures, had been expected to form inside the
riser system proposed to link the cofferdam to the drillship. Pumping warm seawater
from the surface into the annular space between the inner and outer risers has been
advanced as a potential remedy for this scenario. Hydrate formation inside the
containment dome and resulting blockage of the 12-inch-wide opening at the top of
the structure, however, prevents the leaking crude from even reaching the riser.
Clearing out the gas hydrates from the cofferdam would simply be a matter of lifting
it toward the surface into warmer depths until the crystals melt, Suttles said. The
challenge, however, is preventing hydrates from re-forming once the cofferdam is
again at the seabed. BP is exploring options for preventing hydrate formation such
as heating the structure and adding methanol to the cofferdam's interior to lower the
hydrate formation temperature. For now, the cofferdam remains on the seabed away
from the leaking well.
Suttles said that other possibilities for controlling the source of flow and stopping the
flow altogether include injecting ground-up materials into the bottom of the existing
blowout preventer (BOP) in an effort to plug up the device and the well. A risk of
using this "junk shot" method, however, is that it could result in an even
greater volume of crude being released from the top of the BOP. Another option that
is being evaluated is whether to place a second BOP or a similar valve atop the
existing BOP to stop the flow of crude. Suttles noted that BP needs to evaluate
additional data to determine the viability of these approaches.
Suttles also noted that drilling of the first relief is running ahead of schedule and
reached 9,000 feet Saturday. Two relief wells will be drilled to intersect the original
wellbore above the oil reservoir; the idea is to pump heavy fluid into the well to stop
the flow of oil from the reservoir and then pump cement down to permanently seal
the well. The relief wells will intersect the wellbore at a target depth of approximately
18,000 feet.
RIGZONE NEWS
Source: Rigzone Staff
provided by Rigzone.com http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=92998
De opvangtrechter gaat helaas weer even omhoog en wordt aangepast. Er schijnen ijskristallen en/of gashydraten(?) te ontstaan en dat geeft verstoppingen. Dat zal vermoedelijk wel bij het tuutje boven op de trechter plaatsvinden.Expansie?
Nu lijkt dat tuutje op de foto, in verhouding met de rest van de koepel, ook wel een beetje aan de krappe kant.Kan natuurlijk ook optisch bedrog zijn.
We wachten af. Gr.Harry
[quote]
Hydrate is een ijsvorming welke ontstaat door lage temperatuur, hoge druk en gas .... de remedie is om het te verwijderen is methanol te injecteren ...dus in dit geval moet men in de opvangtrechter een druk van @ 172 bar (hydrostatische druk op ocean bodem @5000ft) overbruggen ...om hydrate te voorkomen moet men Glycol injecteren gedurende de flow van olie en gas welke door de onvangtrechter ophoog naar het oppervlakte komt.
In geval van hydrate vorming kan het voorkomen dat het niet mogelijk is de veiligheidskleppen, afsluiters of blowout preventers te laten functioneren.
Persoonlijk denk ik dat er via een kill line welke, opzij is gemonteert van de riser naar surface, de Glycol met mate word geinjecteert gedurende de flow van hetgene (gas & olie) ophoog komt via de opvangtrechter.
Glycol is onschadelijk voor het material en milieu, Methanol daar integen is schadelijk voor onderdelen met rubber, denk daarmee aan seals en andere afdichtings materialen.
MVG TVisser
=======================
Hieronder een van de laatste berichten verkregenvia Rig zone.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
BP Considers Alternatives
Sunday, May 09, 2010
The first attempt to contain leaking crude oil from the Macondo well and funnel it to a
drillship 5,000 feet above failed after gas hydrates accumulated inside the cofferdam
and plugged up the top of the dome, BP reported Saturday.
"I wouldn't say it's failed yet," BP Chief Operating Officer Doug Suttles
said Saturday afternoon of the subsea containment strategy. The BP executive said
that his company is now looking for a way to overcome this latest challenge, tapping
expertise from throughout the oil and gas industry for possible solutions.
Slushy hydrates, ice-like crystals produced by the combination of natural gas and
water at certain temperatures and pressures, had been expected to form inside the
riser system proposed to link the cofferdam to the drillship. Pumping warm seawater
from the surface into the annular space between the inner and outer risers has been
advanced as a potential remedy for this scenario. Hydrate formation inside the
containment dome and resulting blockage of the 12-inch-wide opening at the top of
the structure, however, prevents the leaking crude from even reaching the riser.
Clearing out the gas hydrates from the cofferdam would simply be a matter of lifting
it toward the surface into warmer depths until the crystals melt, Suttles said. The
challenge, however, is preventing hydrates from re-forming once the cofferdam is
again at the seabed. BP is exploring options for preventing hydrate formation such
as heating the structure and adding methanol to the cofferdam's interior to lower the
hydrate formation temperature. For now, the cofferdam remains on the seabed away
from the leaking well.
Suttles said that other possibilities for controlling the source of flow and stopping the
flow altogether include injecting ground-up materials into the bottom of the existing
blowout preventer (BOP) in an effort to plug up the device and the well. A risk of
using this "junk shot" method, however, is that it could result in an even
greater volume of crude being released from the top of the BOP. Another option that
is being evaluated is whether to place a second BOP or a similar valve atop the
existing BOP to stop the flow of crude. Suttles noted that BP needs to evaluate
additional data to determine the viability of these approaches.
Suttles also noted that drilling of the first relief is running ahead of schedule and
reached 9,000 feet Saturday. Two relief wells will be drilled to intersect the original
wellbore above the oil reservoir; the idea is to pump heavy fluid into the well to stop
the flow of oil from the reservoir and then pump cement down to permanently seal
the well. The relief wells will intersect the wellbore at a target depth of approximately
18,000 feet.
RIGZONE NEWS
Source: Rigzone Staff
provided by Rigzone.com http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=92998
Re: Offshore
Bedankt voor de info Teun. Rigzone, site met veel aandacht voor deze ramp.
Vond een schema, hoe ze denken dat het met behulp van een kleinere "trechter" en inspuiting van, zoals je inderdaad zei, methanol hopelijk nu wel lukt.
(schema van BP.)
Gr.Harry
Vond een schema, hoe ze denken dat het met behulp van een kleinere "trechter" en inspuiting van, zoals je inderdaad zei, methanol hopelijk nu wel lukt.
- tophat_containment_system_deployed(kl).jpg (98.05 KiB) 3127 keer bekeken
Gr.Harry
Varen is hunkeren naar land.
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Teun Visser
Re: Offshore
Halllo Harry mooi plaatje van het subsea... ja het injecteren van methanol, zoals beschreven in mijn vorige mailtje, zou kunnen alleen om de hydrate te verwijderen, maar om gedurende de olie en gas via de trechter te laten lopen moet men voordurend Glycol injecteren om Hydrate te voorkomen, ook word nu gesuggereerd om een tweede BOP op de eerste BOP te plaaatsen, want men heeft diverse keren vergeefs getracht de Blind/shear ram te sluiten, tot nu geen succes.BU-6 schreef:Bedankt voor de info Teun. Rigzone, site met veel aandacht voor deze ramp.
Vond een schema, hoe ze denken dat het met behulp van een kleinere "trechter" en inspuiting van, zoals je inderdaad zei, methanol hopelijk nu wel lukt. (schema van BP.)
Gr.Harry
Als men lukt een tweede BOP te plaatsen kan men met behulp van een snubbing of coil tubing installatie een pijp onderdruk naar beneden "snubben" om de well te "killen" (doodpompen).
Intussen worden er twee relief wells geboord .... dit zal ongetwijfeld een maandje of 2-3 duren.
--------------------------
Zojuist iets van het web overgenomen.... mijn vermoedens komen langzaam maar zeker bover water .... zie onderstaande bericht over het niet functioneren van de Blowout preventers van de rig ..en bovendien is de laatste cementplug niet gezet ..of niet naar behoren gezet.... want als Halliburton geen record van een goede pressure test heeft zal Halliburton niet toegeven ...maar simpel zeggen dat de laatste plug niet gezet is .... Maar het kan ook zo maar zijn dat men de cement van de eerste plug niet hard is (droog tijd minimaal 4-8uur) ...Dus het word nu touwtrekken ..tussen de BP productie en drilling ..... normaler wijze moet als de drilling activiteiten zijn afgesloten een "Handover" document opgesteld zijn welke bekrachtigd moet zijn door de drilling supervisor van BP en de productie supervisor van BP ...maar al met al blijft Transocean in gebreke met het niet functioneren van de BOP equipment.
================================
Gulf Spill Hearings Begin
Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa) 5/11/2010
URL: http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=93139
The dispute over who was responsible for the catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico started in earnest on Tuesday, as energy company BP and its contractors pointed fingers at each other before US Congress.
In a related development, the US Coast Guard and the Minerals Management Service opened separate hearings in Kenner, Louisiana, outside New Orleans, with eyewitnesses and company representatives to identify what led to the loss of 11 lives, the sinking of the rig and the subsequent oil leak.
According to testimony released ahead of the Washington hearing before the US Senate's environmental and public works committee, BP says that Transocean and Halliburton must take blame for the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20.
The US government is gearing up for a full-fledged investigation of the disaster that threatens livelihoods and fragile ecology along the Gulf of Mexico coast, even as BP tries in vain to contain and stop 5,000 barrels of crude oil a day from leaking from a 6- kilometre-deep well.
"Transoceans blowout preventer failed to operate," Lamar McKay, chairman of BP America Inc, charges in his prepared testimony for Washington.
The blowout preventer (BOP) is an emergency valve intended to shut off the flow of oil and gas in case of a huge pressure buildup. On April 20, the valve failed to work, causing a huge explosion that sank the 365-million-dollar Deepwater Horizon Rig.
Underwater robots have also been unable to engage the valve mechanically, although BOPs are theoretically designed to also be manipulated by hand.
McKay says his company was "looking at why the blowout preventer did not work because that was to be the fail-safe in case of an accident."
The systems are intended to be fail-safe; sadly, and for reasons we do not yet understand, in this case, they were not," he says.
But Stephen Newman, chief executive officer of Swiss drilling company Transocean, throws the responsibility back to BP in his prepared testimony: "All offshore oil and gas production projects begin and end with the operator." He says that BP had decided where and how" its well was to be drilled.
Newman says it simply makes no sense" to blame the accident on the blowout preventers because the drilling process was complete" and the well already had been sealed with casing and cement."
Tim Probert, president of Halliburton which was to have supplied well-cementing services to the project, charges that his company was contractually bound" to follow BPs instructions. One of the possible contributors to the explosion was faulty pumping of cement into the well head, to close the freshly-drilled well until a production rig could start pumping, according to experts.
But Probert says the final cement plug to close off the well was never set.
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Teun Visser
Re: Offshore
[quote="Teun Visser"][quote="BU-6"]Bedankt voor de info Teun. Rigzone, site met veel aandacht voor deze ramp.
[quote]... Hieronder een verslag van de laatste meeting tussen leden van de USA authorities, Transocen and BP management.
Al eerder mijn vermoedens geuit omtrent geen informatie betreffende de pressure testen en resultaten van de `negative´test. ook de onduidelijkheid van de laatst gezette cmt plug. Als de cementplug niet van goede aard is, dan kan er gas door de cementplug omhoog "migreren" het gas druk de hydrostatische kolom van mud omhoog ... en het gas expandeerd en de druk op de put neemt geleidelijk nagelang het gas omhoog komt toe.
Halliburton probeert van hun zijde de schuld naar de operator te schuiven dat alles is uitgevoerd naar instructies van de operator BP.
Dat de BOP niet naar behoren hebben gefunctioneerd is de oorzaak van de tragedy.
Als de BOP's hadden gewerkt had men simpel het gas eruit kunnen circuleren, en met zwaardere mud de put onder controle kunnen hebben opnieuw de oude cementpluggen uitboren, de casing schoonmaken dmv een scraperrun en vervolgens een nieuwe cementplug zetten.
====================
Execs Point Fingers over Oil Spill
by Siobhan Hughes, Corey Boles
Dow Jones Newswires 5/11/2010
URL: http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=93162
WASHINGTON (Dow Jones Newswires), May 11, 2010
Executives of the three main companies connected with the Gulf of Mexico oil spill pointed fingers at each other in U.S. Senate testimony Tuesday as lawmakers criticized them and federal offshore-drilling regulators.
The first of a round of congressional hearings was convened Tuesday by the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee in the same room used for hearings into the 1912 sinking of the Titanic, the supposedly unsinkable ocean liner--a coincidence noted by Sen. Robert Menendez (D.-N.J.), a critic of offshore drilling.
The Titanic "was a boat so technologically advanced it could not sink," Menendez said. The Deepwater Horizon rig that sank April 20 was supposed to be "a rig so technologically advanced it could not spill."
Senators pressed executives from BP PLC (BP, BP.LN), the well's owner; Transocean Ltd. (RIG, RIG.EB), the rig owner; and Halliburton Co. (HAL), a major drilling operations contractor, for answers as to what caused the explosion that ultimately sank the Deepwater Horizon rig. In response, the company executives highlighted questions about each other's performance.
In his testimony, Halliburton executive Tim Probert said the company had not placed a final cement plug within the well when the accident occurred. The plug is designed to prevent gas from escaping up the pipe to the surface.
Such plugs are normally put in before heavy drilling fluid, or is removed, according to industry experts. But in the case of the Deepwater Horizon, Probert said drilling mud was removed before a final cement plug was placed in the well. The mud was replaced with seawater, which is much lighter than mud.
Probert declined to say how frequently companies remove mud before installing the final cement plug. He went beyond his prepared testimony on Tuesday and said that a final test of the integrity of the cement wasn't performed. He said that two other tests, a "negative" and a "positive" pressure test, were performed, but "I can't comment as to what the information was."
He stressed that Halliburton "is contractually bound to comply with the well owner's instructions on all matters relating to the performance of all work-related activities."
Citing a worker who was on the drilling rig at the time of the April 20 explosion, The Wall Street Journal reported Tuesday that Halliburton was getting ready to set a final cement plug at 8,000 feet below the rig when workers received other instructions. According to this worker, BP asked permission from the federal Minerals Management Service to displace the mud before the final plugging operation had begun.
Asked about The Journal's report by Sen. Jeff Sessions (R., Ala.), BP America's chairman and president, Lamar McKay, said he had not read the article and was not "familiar with the procedure on that particular well."
Probert and Transocean Chief Executive Steven Newman said any discussion with the MMS would have involved BP.
Lamar McKay, head of BP America, said it was Transocean that "had the responsibility for the safety." McKay said no conclusions should be drawn before an investigation is complete, but that "we've not dealt with a situation like this before" involving drilling in ultra-deep waters 5,000 feet below the sea.
In an interview after the hearing, Sessions called the witnesses' responses "disappointing" and faulted them for what he said was a shortage of "candor."
"It would have been appropriate for them to be more forthcoming," he added.
Deepwater drilling, which involves drilling in depths of at least 1,000 feet of water, has boomed over the past decade as U.S. oil companies shut out of unfriendly foreign territories have searched for domestic supplies. At the end of 2008, some 141 projects were producing oil in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico, up from 122 in 2006, according to the U.S. Interior Department's Minerals Management Service. Drilling in the Gulf of Mexico now accounts for 30% of domestic oil production, with three-fourths of the oil production coming from deepwater activities.
The cause of the April 20 Deepwater Horizon disaster remains unclear.
"The one thing we know with certainty" is that in the blast "there was a sudden, catastrophic failure of the cement, the casing or both," Transocean's Newman said.
The fingerpointing prompted Alaska Republican Sen. Lisa Murkowski to warn all three companies could be hurt if the industry can not restore confidence in offshore drilling safety. "This incident will impact [upon] the development of energy policy for our country," she said.
Committee Chairman Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D, N.M.), said that a combination of human, technological and regulatory failures were to blame.
"At the heart of this disaster are three interrelated systems--a technological system of materials and equipment, a human system of persons who operated the technological system and a regulatory system," Bingaman said. "These interrelated systems failed in a way that many have said was virtually impossible. We need to examine closely the extent to which each of these systems failed to do what it was supposed to do."
Senators also questioned the performance of the Interior Department's Minerals Management Service, the regulator for offshore drilling operations.
The Obama Administration announced Tuesday plans to split up the MMS, separating the parts of the agency that oversee rig safety from the operations that collect oil revenue.
Copyright (c) 2010 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
=============
[quote]... Hieronder een verslag van de laatste meeting tussen leden van de USA authorities, Transocen and BP management.
Al eerder mijn vermoedens geuit omtrent geen informatie betreffende de pressure testen en resultaten van de `negative´test. ook de onduidelijkheid van de laatst gezette cmt plug. Als de cementplug niet van goede aard is, dan kan er gas door de cementplug omhoog "migreren" het gas druk de hydrostatische kolom van mud omhoog ... en het gas expandeerd en de druk op de put neemt geleidelijk nagelang het gas omhoog komt toe.
Halliburton probeert van hun zijde de schuld naar de operator te schuiven dat alles is uitgevoerd naar instructies van de operator BP.
Dat de BOP niet naar behoren hebben gefunctioneerd is de oorzaak van de tragedy.
Als de BOP's hadden gewerkt had men simpel het gas eruit kunnen circuleren, en met zwaardere mud de put onder controle kunnen hebben opnieuw de oude cementpluggen uitboren, de casing schoonmaken dmv een scraperrun en vervolgens een nieuwe cementplug zetten.
====================
Execs Point Fingers over Oil Spill
by Siobhan Hughes, Corey Boles
Dow Jones Newswires 5/11/2010
URL: http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=93162
WASHINGTON (Dow Jones Newswires), May 11, 2010
Executives of the three main companies connected with the Gulf of Mexico oil spill pointed fingers at each other in U.S. Senate testimony Tuesday as lawmakers criticized them and federal offshore-drilling regulators.
The first of a round of congressional hearings was convened Tuesday by the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee in the same room used for hearings into the 1912 sinking of the Titanic, the supposedly unsinkable ocean liner--a coincidence noted by Sen. Robert Menendez (D.-N.J.), a critic of offshore drilling.
The Titanic "was a boat so technologically advanced it could not sink," Menendez said. The Deepwater Horizon rig that sank April 20 was supposed to be "a rig so technologically advanced it could not spill."
Senators pressed executives from BP PLC (BP, BP.LN), the well's owner; Transocean Ltd. (RIG, RIG.EB), the rig owner; and Halliburton Co. (HAL), a major drilling operations contractor, for answers as to what caused the explosion that ultimately sank the Deepwater Horizon rig. In response, the company executives highlighted questions about each other's performance.
In his testimony, Halliburton executive Tim Probert said the company had not placed a final cement plug within the well when the accident occurred. The plug is designed to prevent gas from escaping up the pipe to the surface.
Such plugs are normally put in before heavy drilling fluid, or is removed, according to industry experts. But in the case of the Deepwater Horizon, Probert said drilling mud was removed before a final cement plug was placed in the well. The mud was replaced with seawater, which is much lighter than mud.
Probert declined to say how frequently companies remove mud before installing the final cement plug. He went beyond his prepared testimony on Tuesday and said that a final test of the integrity of the cement wasn't performed. He said that two other tests, a "negative" and a "positive" pressure test, were performed, but "I can't comment as to what the information was."
He stressed that Halliburton "is contractually bound to comply with the well owner's instructions on all matters relating to the performance of all work-related activities."
Citing a worker who was on the drilling rig at the time of the April 20 explosion, The Wall Street Journal reported Tuesday that Halliburton was getting ready to set a final cement plug at 8,000 feet below the rig when workers received other instructions. According to this worker, BP asked permission from the federal Minerals Management Service to displace the mud before the final plugging operation had begun.
Asked about The Journal's report by Sen. Jeff Sessions (R., Ala.), BP America's chairman and president, Lamar McKay, said he had not read the article and was not "familiar with the procedure on that particular well."
Probert and Transocean Chief Executive Steven Newman said any discussion with the MMS would have involved BP.
Lamar McKay, head of BP America, said it was Transocean that "had the responsibility for the safety." McKay said no conclusions should be drawn before an investigation is complete, but that "we've not dealt with a situation like this before" involving drilling in ultra-deep waters 5,000 feet below the sea.
In an interview after the hearing, Sessions called the witnesses' responses "disappointing" and faulted them for what he said was a shortage of "candor."
"It would have been appropriate for them to be more forthcoming," he added.
Deepwater drilling, which involves drilling in depths of at least 1,000 feet of water, has boomed over the past decade as U.S. oil companies shut out of unfriendly foreign territories have searched for domestic supplies. At the end of 2008, some 141 projects were producing oil in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico, up from 122 in 2006, according to the U.S. Interior Department's Minerals Management Service. Drilling in the Gulf of Mexico now accounts for 30% of domestic oil production, with three-fourths of the oil production coming from deepwater activities.
The cause of the April 20 Deepwater Horizon disaster remains unclear.
"The one thing we know with certainty" is that in the blast "there was a sudden, catastrophic failure of the cement, the casing or both," Transocean's Newman said.
The fingerpointing prompted Alaska Republican Sen. Lisa Murkowski to warn all three companies could be hurt if the industry can not restore confidence in offshore drilling safety. "This incident will impact [upon] the development of energy policy for our country," she said.
Committee Chairman Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D, N.M.), said that a combination of human, technological and regulatory failures were to blame.
"At the heart of this disaster are three interrelated systems--a technological system of materials and equipment, a human system of persons who operated the technological system and a regulatory system," Bingaman said. "These interrelated systems failed in a way that many have said was virtually impossible. We need to examine closely the extent to which each of these systems failed to do what it was supposed to do."
Senators also questioned the performance of the Interior Department's Minerals Management Service, the regulator for offshore drilling operations.
The Obama Administration announced Tuesday plans to split up the MMS, separating the parts of the agency that oversee rig safety from the operations that collect oil revenue.
Copyright (c) 2010 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
=============
-
Teun Visser
Re: Offshore
[quote="Teun Visser"]
Al eerder mijn vermoedens geuit omtrent geen informatie betreffende de pressure testen en resultaten van de `negative´test. ook de onduidelijkheid van de laatst gezette cmt plug. Als de cementplug niet van goede aard is, dan kan er gas door de cementplug omhoog "migreren" het gas druk de hydrostatische kolom van mud omhoog ... en het gas expandeerd en de druk op de put neemt geleidelijk nagelang het gas omhoog komt toe.
Halliburton probeert van hun zijde de schuld naar de operator te schuiven dat alles is uitgevoerd naar instructies van de operator BP.
Dat de BOP niet naar behoren hebben gefunctioneerd is de oorzaak van de tragedy.
Als de BOP's hadden gewerkt had men simpel het gas eruit kunnen circuleren, en met zwaardere mud de put onder controle kunnen hebben opnieuw de oude cementpluggen uitboren, de casing schoonmaken dmv een scraperrun en vervolgens een nieuwe cementplug zetten.
====================
Execs Point Fingers over Oil Spill
by Siobhan Hughes, Corey Boles
Dow Jones Newswires 5/11/2010
URL: http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=93162
WASHINGTON (Dow Jones Newswires), May 11, 2010
Executives of the three main companies connected with the Gulf of Mexico oil spill pointed fingers at each other in U.S. Senate testimony Tuesday as lawmakers criticized them and federal offshore-drilling regulators.
The first of a round of congressional hearings was convened Tuesday by the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee in the same room used for hearings into the 1912 sinking of the Titanic, the supposedly unsinkable ocean liner--a coincidence noted by Sen. Robert Menendez (D.-N.J.), a critic of offshore drilling.
The Titanic "was a boat so technologically advanced it could not sink," Menendez said. The Deepwater Horizon rig that sank April 20 was supposed to be "a rig so technologically advanced it could not spill."
Senators pressed executives from BP PLC (BP, BP.LN), the well's owner; Transocean Ltd. (RIG, RIG.EB), the rig owner; and Halliburton Co. (HAL), a major drilling operations contractor, for answers as to what caused the explosion that ultimately sank the Deepwater Horizon rig. In response, the company executives highlighted questions about each other's performance.
In his testimony, Halliburton executive Tim Probert said the company had not placed a final cement plug within the well when the accident occurred. The plug is designed to prevent gas from escaping up the pipe to the surface.
Such plugs are normally put in before heavy drilling fluid, or is removed, according to industry experts. But in the case of the Deepwater Horizon, Probert said drilling mud was removed before a final cement plug was placed in the well. The mud was replaced with seawater, which is much lighter than mud.
Probert declined to say how frequently companies remove mud before installing the final cement plug. He went beyond his prepared testimony on Tuesday and said that a final test of the integrity of the cement wasn't performed. He said that two other tests, a "negative" and a "positive" pressure test, were performed, but "I can't comment as to what the information was."
He stressed that Halliburton "is contractually bound to comply with the well owner's instructions on all matters relating to the performance of all work-related activities."
Citing a worker who was on the drilling rig at the time of the April 20 explosion, The Wall Street Journal reported Tuesday that Halliburton was getting ready to set a final cement plug at 8,000 feet below the rig when workers received other instructions. According to this worker, BP asked permission from the federal Minerals Management Service to displace the mud before the final plugging operation had begun.
Asked about The Journal's report by Sen. Jeff Sessions (R., Ala.), BP America's chairman and president, Lamar McKay, said he had not read the article and was not "familiar with the procedure on that particular well."
Probert and Transocean Chief Executive Steven Newman said any discussion with the MMS would have involved BP.
Lamar McKay, head of BP America, said it was Transocean that "had the responsibility for the safety." McKay said no conclusions should be drawn before an investigation is complete, but that "we've not dealt with a situation like this before" involving drilling in ultra-deep waters 5,000 feet below the sea.
In an interview after the hearing, Sessions called the witnesses' responses "disappointing" and faulted them for what he said was a shortage of "candor."
"It would have been appropriate for them to be more forthcoming," he added.
Deepwater drilling, which involves drilling in depths of at least 1,000 feet of water, has boomed over the past decade as U.S. oil companies shut out of unfriendly foreign territories have searched for domestic supplies. At the end of 2008, some 141 projects were producing oil in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico, up from 122 in 2006, according to the U.S. Interior Department's Minerals Management Service. Drilling in the Gulf of Mexico now accounts for 30% of domestic oil production, with three-fourths of the oil production coming from deepwater activities.
The cause of the April 20 Deepwater Horizon disaster remains unclear.
"The one thing we know with certainty" is that in the blast "there was a sudden, catastrophic failure of the cement, the casing or both," Transocean's Newman said.
The fingerpointing prompted Alaska Republican Sen. Lisa Murkowski to warn all three companies could be hurt if the industry can not restore confidence in offshore drilling safety. "This incident will impact [upon] the development of energy policy for our country," she said.
Committee Chairman Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D, N.M.), said that a combination of human, technological and regulatory failures were to blame.
"At the heart of this disaster are three interrelated systems--a technological system of materials and equipment, a human system of persons who operated the technological system and a regulatory system," Bingaman said. "These interrelated systems failed in a way that many have said was virtually impossible. We need to examine closely the extent to which each of these systems failed to do what it was supposed to do."
Senators also questioned the performance of the Interior Department's Minerals Management Service, the regulator for offshore drilling operations.
The Obama Administration announced Tuesday plans to split up the MMS, separating the parts of the agency that oversee rig safety from the operations that collect oil revenue.
============================================
...Vanmorgen via een mail van BP een hyperlink gekregen met
van alles omtrent de oil spill en update van de "top kill".
Update on Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Response - 13 May
BP today provided an update on developments in the response to the MC252 oil well incident in the Gulf of Mexico.
Subsea Source Control and Containment
Subsea efforts continue to focus on, firstly, progressing options to stop the flow of oil from the well through interventions via the blow out preventer (BOP) and, secondly, attempts to contain the flow of oil at source to reduce the amount spreading on the surface. These efforts are being carried out in conjunction with governmental authorities and other industry experts.
Further investigation of the failed BOP, using remotely-operated vehicles and a variety of diagnostic techniques, has increased our understanding of the condition of the BOP and allowed planning to continue for a number of potential interventions, including for a so-called "top kill" of the well.
This would involve first injecting material of varying densities and sizes (also known as "junk shot") into the internal spaces of the BOP to provide a seal, before pumping specialised heavy fluids into the well to prevent further flow up the well. Plans for this option are being developed in preparation for potential application next week.
Work to deploy a second system designed to contain the oil flow subsea has continued. A small dome or "top hat" has been taken out to the well site and placed on the seabed in preparation for deployment. Such a system has never been used in water depths of 5,000 feet and its successful operation is not certain. The deployment of this system is expected to be attempted within the next few days.
All of the techniques being attempted or evaluated to contain the flow of oil on the seabed involve significant uncertainties because they have not been tested in these conditions before.
Work on the first relief well, which began on Sunday May 2, continues. It is expected to take some three months to complete. The drilling rig that will drill the second relief well is currently en route to the site, expected to arrive by Friday.
Surface Spill Response and Containment
Work continues to collect and disperse oil that has reached the surface of the sea. Over 530 vessels are involved in the response effort, including skimmers, tugs, barges and recovery vessels.
Over 120 flights have been made to apply dispersant to the spill since the response effort began.
Intensive operations to skim oil from the surface of the water also continued. Some 97,000 barrels of oily liquid have now been recovered.
The total length of boom deployed as part of efforts to prevent oil reaching the coast is now more than 1.2 million feet, with a further 400,000 feet staged in readiness for deployment.
In total over 13,000 personnel from BP, other companies and government agencies are currently involved in the response to this incident. Over 16,000 people have registered to volunteer across four states. So far 6,700 claims have been filed, of which about 1,000 have already been paid. BP has also received 46,500 calls into its help lines, approximately 30 per cent of which have offered ideas to help the response or other assistance.
The cost to date of the response amounts to about $450 million, including the cost of spill response, containment, relief well drilling, commitments to the Gulf Coast States, settlements and federal costs.
http://www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com
http://www.bp.com/gulfofmexico
MVG Teun
---------------
Al eerder mijn vermoedens geuit omtrent geen informatie betreffende de pressure testen en resultaten van de `negative´test. ook de onduidelijkheid van de laatst gezette cmt plug. Als de cementplug niet van goede aard is, dan kan er gas door de cementplug omhoog "migreren" het gas druk de hydrostatische kolom van mud omhoog ... en het gas expandeerd en de druk op de put neemt geleidelijk nagelang het gas omhoog komt toe.
Halliburton probeert van hun zijde de schuld naar de operator te schuiven dat alles is uitgevoerd naar instructies van de operator BP.
Dat de BOP niet naar behoren hebben gefunctioneerd is de oorzaak van de tragedy.
Als de BOP's hadden gewerkt had men simpel het gas eruit kunnen circuleren, en met zwaardere mud de put onder controle kunnen hebben opnieuw de oude cementpluggen uitboren, de casing schoonmaken dmv een scraperrun en vervolgens een nieuwe cementplug zetten.
====================
Execs Point Fingers over Oil Spill
by Siobhan Hughes, Corey Boles
Dow Jones Newswires 5/11/2010
URL: http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=93162
WASHINGTON (Dow Jones Newswires), May 11, 2010
Executives of the three main companies connected with the Gulf of Mexico oil spill pointed fingers at each other in U.S. Senate testimony Tuesday as lawmakers criticized them and federal offshore-drilling regulators.
The first of a round of congressional hearings was convened Tuesday by the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee in the same room used for hearings into the 1912 sinking of the Titanic, the supposedly unsinkable ocean liner--a coincidence noted by Sen. Robert Menendez (D.-N.J.), a critic of offshore drilling.
The Titanic "was a boat so technologically advanced it could not sink," Menendez said. The Deepwater Horizon rig that sank April 20 was supposed to be "a rig so technologically advanced it could not spill."
Senators pressed executives from BP PLC (BP, BP.LN), the well's owner; Transocean Ltd. (RIG, RIG.EB), the rig owner; and Halliburton Co. (HAL), a major drilling operations contractor, for answers as to what caused the explosion that ultimately sank the Deepwater Horizon rig. In response, the company executives highlighted questions about each other's performance.
In his testimony, Halliburton executive Tim Probert said the company had not placed a final cement plug within the well when the accident occurred. The plug is designed to prevent gas from escaping up the pipe to the surface.
Such plugs are normally put in before heavy drilling fluid, or is removed, according to industry experts. But in the case of the Deepwater Horizon, Probert said drilling mud was removed before a final cement plug was placed in the well. The mud was replaced with seawater, which is much lighter than mud.
Probert declined to say how frequently companies remove mud before installing the final cement plug. He went beyond his prepared testimony on Tuesday and said that a final test of the integrity of the cement wasn't performed. He said that two other tests, a "negative" and a "positive" pressure test, were performed, but "I can't comment as to what the information was."
He stressed that Halliburton "is contractually bound to comply with the well owner's instructions on all matters relating to the performance of all work-related activities."
Citing a worker who was on the drilling rig at the time of the April 20 explosion, The Wall Street Journal reported Tuesday that Halliburton was getting ready to set a final cement plug at 8,000 feet below the rig when workers received other instructions. According to this worker, BP asked permission from the federal Minerals Management Service to displace the mud before the final plugging operation had begun.
Asked about The Journal's report by Sen. Jeff Sessions (R., Ala.), BP America's chairman and president, Lamar McKay, said he had not read the article and was not "familiar with the procedure on that particular well."
Probert and Transocean Chief Executive Steven Newman said any discussion with the MMS would have involved BP.
Lamar McKay, head of BP America, said it was Transocean that "had the responsibility for the safety." McKay said no conclusions should be drawn before an investigation is complete, but that "we've not dealt with a situation like this before" involving drilling in ultra-deep waters 5,000 feet below the sea.
In an interview after the hearing, Sessions called the witnesses' responses "disappointing" and faulted them for what he said was a shortage of "candor."
"It would have been appropriate for them to be more forthcoming," he added.
Deepwater drilling, which involves drilling in depths of at least 1,000 feet of water, has boomed over the past decade as U.S. oil companies shut out of unfriendly foreign territories have searched for domestic supplies. At the end of 2008, some 141 projects were producing oil in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico, up from 122 in 2006, according to the U.S. Interior Department's Minerals Management Service. Drilling in the Gulf of Mexico now accounts for 30% of domestic oil production, with three-fourths of the oil production coming from deepwater activities.
The cause of the April 20 Deepwater Horizon disaster remains unclear.
"The one thing we know with certainty" is that in the blast "there was a sudden, catastrophic failure of the cement, the casing or both," Transocean's Newman said.
The fingerpointing prompted Alaska Republican Sen. Lisa Murkowski to warn all three companies could be hurt if the industry can not restore confidence in offshore drilling safety. "This incident will impact [upon] the development of energy policy for our country," she said.
Committee Chairman Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D, N.M.), said that a combination of human, technological and regulatory failures were to blame.
"At the heart of this disaster are three interrelated systems--a technological system of materials and equipment, a human system of persons who operated the technological system and a regulatory system," Bingaman said. "These interrelated systems failed in a way that many have said was virtually impossible. We need to examine closely the extent to which each of these systems failed to do what it was supposed to do."
Senators also questioned the performance of the Interior Department's Minerals Management Service, the regulator for offshore drilling operations.
The Obama Administration announced Tuesday plans to split up the MMS, separating the parts of the agency that oversee rig safety from the operations that collect oil revenue.
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...Vanmorgen via een mail van BP een hyperlink gekregen met
van alles omtrent de oil spill en update van de "top kill".
Update on Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Response - 13 May
BP today provided an update on developments in the response to the MC252 oil well incident in the Gulf of Mexico.
Subsea Source Control and Containment
Subsea efforts continue to focus on, firstly, progressing options to stop the flow of oil from the well through interventions via the blow out preventer (BOP) and, secondly, attempts to contain the flow of oil at source to reduce the amount spreading on the surface. These efforts are being carried out in conjunction with governmental authorities and other industry experts.
Further investigation of the failed BOP, using remotely-operated vehicles and a variety of diagnostic techniques, has increased our understanding of the condition of the BOP and allowed planning to continue for a number of potential interventions, including for a so-called "top kill" of the well.
This would involve first injecting material of varying densities and sizes (also known as "junk shot") into the internal spaces of the BOP to provide a seal, before pumping specialised heavy fluids into the well to prevent further flow up the well. Plans for this option are being developed in preparation for potential application next week.
Work to deploy a second system designed to contain the oil flow subsea has continued. A small dome or "top hat" has been taken out to the well site and placed on the seabed in preparation for deployment. Such a system has never been used in water depths of 5,000 feet and its successful operation is not certain. The deployment of this system is expected to be attempted within the next few days.
All of the techniques being attempted or evaluated to contain the flow of oil on the seabed involve significant uncertainties because they have not been tested in these conditions before.
Work on the first relief well, which began on Sunday May 2, continues. It is expected to take some three months to complete. The drilling rig that will drill the second relief well is currently en route to the site, expected to arrive by Friday.
Surface Spill Response and Containment
Work continues to collect and disperse oil that has reached the surface of the sea. Over 530 vessels are involved in the response effort, including skimmers, tugs, barges and recovery vessels.
Over 120 flights have been made to apply dispersant to the spill since the response effort began.
Intensive operations to skim oil from the surface of the water also continued. Some 97,000 barrels of oily liquid have now been recovered.
The total length of boom deployed as part of efforts to prevent oil reaching the coast is now more than 1.2 million feet, with a further 400,000 feet staged in readiness for deployment.
In total over 13,000 personnel from BP, other companies and government agencies are currently involved in the response to this incident. Over 16,000 people have registered to volunteer across four states. So far 6,700 claims have been filed, of which about 1,000 have already been paid. BP has also received 46,500 calls into its help lines, approximately 30 per cent of which have offered ideas to help the response or other assistance.
The cost to date of the response amounts to about $450 million, including the cost of spill response, containment, relief well drilling, commitments to the Gulf Coast States, settlements and federal costs.
http://www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com
http://www.bp.com/gulfofmexico
MVG Teun
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